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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Courts of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h), appeals from the district court involving domestic 
relations including, but not limited to, divorce. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in failing to impute full-time employment to 
Appellee, Diane Fish? 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App. 236 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); 
Chiids v. Chiids, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah 1993); Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Rasband v. Rasband, 
752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. 
"The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce an income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or 
operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in 
the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the 
payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
the marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a). Three factors "must be considered in fixing a 
reasonable alimony award: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the wife; (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the 
husband to provide support." Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
"If these factors have been considered, 'we will not disturb the trial court's 
alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion.'" Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App. 236 {citing Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 
946 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in imputing full-time income to Jeffrey Fish 
even though he was enrolled at the Ogden-Weber Applied Technology College? 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(d)(iii); Allred v. Alfred, 
797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Mancil v. Smith, 2000 UT App. 378 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); Stevens 
v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. 
"Ordinarily, we accord the trial court considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial interests of divorced parties and, thus, the court's 'actions are entitled to a 
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presumption of validity."' Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
citins Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
"A trial court's findings are adequate only if they are 'sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached." Mancil v. Smith, 2000 UT App. 378 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000); citing Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in establishing alimony, based upon the parties' 
historical income and standard of living? 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) & (c); Willev v. Willev, 866 
P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); 
Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008); Higlev v. Higlev, 676 P.2d 
379, 382 (Utah 1983); English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. 
"A trial court's award of alimony is not disturbed unless there is clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion." Willev v. Willev, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
citins Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
"A district court has broad discretion when deciding alimony awards." 
Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008); citins Higlev v. Higlev, 676 
P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983). 
"The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(viii) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ix) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce an income; 
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(x) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(xi) the length of the marriage; 
(xii) whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children 
requiring support; 
(xiii) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or 
operated by the payor spouse; and 
(xiv) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in 
the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the 
payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
the marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a). 
"Along with these factors, a district court also considers the primary aims of 
alimony when making an award: (1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same 
standard of living that existed during the marriage . . .; (2) to equalize the standards of 
living of each party . . . ; and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public 
charge." Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 at 943; citing English v. English, 565 
P.2d409,411 (Utah 1977). 
"As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with subsection (8)(a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in 
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In 
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
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marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the 
marriage:' Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c). 
Issue 4: Did the trial err in imputing $30,000 to $40,000 annual income to 
Jeffrey Fish? 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(d)(iii); Allred v. Allred, 
797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Mancil v. Smith, 2000 UT App. 378 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); Stevens 
v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. 
"Ordinarily, we accord the trial court considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial interests of divorced parties and, thus, the court's 'actions are entitled to a 
presumption of validity.'" Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
citing Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
"A trial court's findings are adequate only if they are 'sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached." Mancil v. Smith, 2000 UT App. 378 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000); citing Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are determinative and/or are at issue in this appeal: 
(1) Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8): 
(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce an income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children 
requiring support 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or 
operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in 
the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with subsection (8)(a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in 
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In 
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
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marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the 
marriage. 
(2) Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7): 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the 
condition is not of a temporary nature: 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic 
job skills. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
As reflected in the record, this is a domestic case involving a divorce between 
Appellant Jeffrey Fish and Appellee Diane Fish. Several issues were certified for 
resolution by the trial court, namely: (1) whether Diane Fish would receive alimony, and 
if so, the amount of alimony she should receive; (2) whether Jeffrey Fish was capable of 
employment; and (3) whether Diane Fish should receive one-half (1/2) of Jeffrey Fish's 
retirement. Essentially, this case involved the issues of alimony and retirement. See 
Trial Transcript Volume 1 at pg. 6. 
Diane Fish initiated this matter by filing a Complaint for Divorce along with a 
Motion for Temporary Orders on or about October 30, 2007; Jeffrey Fish filed his 
Answer on or about November 19, 2007. On or about January 31, 2008, Diane Fish's 
Motion for Temporary Orders was heard before Commissioner Catherine Conklin of the 
Second District Court, Weber County. The parties stipulated that they would each 
receive a distribution of $10,000 from the sale of their marital residence, with the 
remaining balance of approximately $83,000 being held in Diane Fish's counsel's trust 
account. A bench trial was held in this matter on or about April 27, 28, and 30, 2009, 
before the Honorable Ernie W. Jones of the Second District Court in and for Weber 
County. 
At the conclusion of the bench trial, Judge Jones took the case under advisement 
so as to provide a written decision. On or about June 16, 2009, the trial court issued its 
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Memorandum Decision, and on or about September 28, 2009, issued its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. The trial court affirmed the parties' stipulation that Diane Fish 
was to receive one-half (1/2) of Jeffrey Fish's military retirement, which amounted to 
approximately $633 per month; and that Jeffrey Fish was to receive VA Disability 
payments in the amount of $649 per month and $649 per month as his one-half (1/2) 
share of the military retirement. 
The trial court found that Jeffrey Fish was physically capable of full-time 
employment and was therefore under-employed. The trial court heard evidence regarding 
vocational options available to Jeffrey Fish as well as the income associated with said 
vocations. Based on the evidence, the trial court imputed a full-time income of $30,000 
to $40,000 per year to Jeffrey Fish. The trial court found that Jeffrey Fish's monthly 
living expenses were reasonable at $2,374. 
In addition, the trial court found that Diane Fish earned a gross income of $25,000 
in 2008, or $1,628 in net monthly income. The trial court determined that Diane Fish's 
average gross income for 2009 - January through April - was approximately $2,000 per 
month. The trial court determined that Diane Fish's living expenses were reasonable at 
$3,000 per month. 
Based on the parties' income tax returns for 2002 through 2008, the trial court 
determined that the parties' were capable of earning a reasonable income and that the tax 
returns were relevant to establish income potential. Based upon Jeffrey Fish's ability to 
work and to earn a reasonable income, the trial court determined that Diane Fish had a 
need for alimony and that Jeffrey Fish had the ability to pay alimony. The trial court set 
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alimony at $800 per month for a period of 27 years, subject to Diane Fish's remarriage, 
cohabitation or death. 
Jeffrey Fish filed his Notice of Appeal on October 27, 2009. The issues presented 
on appeal are whether the trial court abused its discretion in not imputing income to 
Diane Fish; whether the trial court abused its discretion in imputing a full-time wage to 
Jeffrey Fish even though he was enrolled at the Ogden-Weber Applied Technology 
College; whether the trial court abused its discretion by considering the standard of living 
and respective abilities of the parties to earn income at the time of trial rather than during 
the marriage; and whether the trial court abused its discretion in imputing a full-time 
income to Jeffrey Fish without indicating his employability in a specific vocation. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on September 5, 1980. See Trial Transcript 
Volume 1 at pg. 126. The parties' separated in or about October of 2007, and Appellee 
filed her Complaint for Divorce on or about October 30, 2007. 
2. Appellee is an office manager in a dental office and earns $15 per hour. 
See Trial Transcript Volume 1 at pg. 158-160. 
3. Appellee has worked in this capacity for approximately 14 or 15 years and 
works Monday through Thursday from 7:30am to 4:30pm. Id. at 158. 
4. Appellee works on Fridays depending on the dentists' schedules as well as 
the schedules of the other employees. Id. at 160. Appellee does not have control over 
her work schedule and works as much as she is able to ensure that the office is properly 
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staffed; however, Appellee's dental office is not always business enough to allow 
Appellee to work a full 40 hour week, Id. 
5. The trial court found Appellee's monthly living expenses to be reasonable 
at approximately $3,000 per month. See Findings of Fact at 32. 
6. The trial court found Appellant's monthly living expenses to be reasonable 
at approximately $2,374 per month. Id. at 28. 
7. Appellant was in the Air Force from 1980 to 2000, and retired after twenty 
(20) years service as an aircraft mechanic. See Findings of Fact at 13. 
8. Appellant worked at Great Western Aviation from September 2000 to 
October 2001, earning approximately $27,000 per year. IcL at 14. 
9. Appellant was employed at Karta Technologies from October 2001 to May 
2003, earning $3,333 to $3,800 per month or $27,000 to $46,000 annually. Id at 15. 
10. Appellant had no income from 2003 to 2006. Id at 16. 
11. Appellant worked at Fair Air, LLC, from April 2006 to September 2007 
with an annual salary of $25,382. Id, at 17. 
12. Appellant was not employed in 2009, and claims he is unable to work in his 
former vocation as an aircraft mechanic because of lower back pain and disability. Id. at 
18, 19. 
13. Appellant underwent a Functional Capacity Evaluation performed by 
Ernest Chavez, a physical therapist for Wasatch Physical Therapy. See Respondent's 
Exhibit 6, atpg. 3. 
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14. Mr. Chavez opined that Appellant was physically incapable of working as 
an aircraft mechanic, Id. and see Findings of Fact at 20. 
15. As a close friend of Appellant for many years, the trial court found Mr. 
Chavez's testimony to be suspect. Id. at 21. 
16. Jim and Mary Templeton testified that Appellant went boating, jet skiing, 
tubing, and performed such tasks as laying sod, installing a fence, lifting hay bales, and 
replacing a roof during 2004 through 2006. IcL at 24. The Templeton5 s said that 
Appellant never complaint of back pain during any of the above-events. Id. 
17. The trial court determined that Appellant was capable of working full-time 
and was capable of earning a reasonable income. Id. at 26 & 34. 
18. Kristy Farnsworth, a vocational specialist, conducted an employability 
evaluation on the Appellant in August 2008 and concluded that Appellant could earn 
between $24,000 and $57,000 annually. Id. at 25 and see Petitioner's Exhibit 1. 
19. The trial court found Appellant underemployed; and, based on the parties' 
income tax returns and the testimony of Ms. Farnsworth, imputed an income of $30,000 
to $40,000 per year to Appellant. IcL at 26, 27. 
20. Based upon the parties' income and expenses, the trial court awarded 
Appellee alimony in the amount of $800 per month, subject to Appellee's remarriage, 
cohabitation, death, or the length of the marriage, whichever comes first. Id. at 41. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no basis to reverse the decision of the trial court in this case. The trial 
court acted within its discretion in not imputing income to Diane Fish; the trial court 
acted within its discretion in imputing a full-time wage to Jeffrey Fish even though he 
was enrolled at the Ogden-Weber Applied Technology College; the trial court acted 
within its discretion by considering the standard ofliving and respective abilities of the 
parties to earn income at the time of trial rather than during the marriage; and the trial 
court acted within its discretion in imputing a full-time income to Jeffrey Fish without 
indicating his employability in a specific vocation 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO IMPUTE 
ADDITIONAL INCOME TO APPELLEE AND THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION NOT TO IMPUTE ADDITIONAL INCOME 
TO APPELLE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to impute full-time 
employment to Appellee, Diane Fish. See Apellant's Brief at 19. According to 
Appellant, the trial court's failure to impute additional income to Appellee constitutes an 
abuse of discretion which justifies overturning the trial court's alimony determination. 
Id. In support thereof, Appellant points out that a trial court must consider the factors 
enumerated in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) in determining alimony. Id. at 20, 21. 
Additionally, Appellant observes that Utah courts have paid particularly close attention to 
the first three (3) of such factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; (2) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; and (3) the 
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ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Id and see Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1075 (Utah 1985). The Appellant argues, in effect, that the trial court's failure to impute 
additional income to Appellee is tantamount to a failure to properly consider Appellee's 
earning capacity or ability to produce income and is therefore an abuse of discretion. 
Appellant's argument fails because a trail court is not required to impute 
additional income. Appellant cites two (2) Utah cases in which the trial court imputed a 
full-time wage to an underemployed female spouse. See Apellant's Brief at 19. In 
Thronson the Utah Court of Appeals imputed a full-time wage to the recipient spouse 
who was a part-time pharmacist. Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 434 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). The recipient spouse had been working full-time as a pharmacist prior to 
and during a portion of the marriage, but voluntarily chose to work part-time so that she 
could remain home with the parties' minor children. In imputing full-time wages to the 
recipient spouse, the court found that the "finding was based on competent evidence and 
represents the midpoint of an annual gross salary range . . ." Id. 
Similarly, in Willey the trial court imputed a full-time wage to the recipient spouse 
who was qualified to teach school. Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). The Court of Appeals held, however, that the evidence did not support the trial 
court's imputation of income to the recipient spouse. Id Notably, the Court stated that 
"[imputed income] cannot be premised on mere conjecture; instead, it demands careful 
and precise assessment requiring detailed findings." Id. Clearly, a trial court is not 
required to impute income; rather, income can only be imputed if "competent evidence" 
is presented which details a "careful and precise assessment" of a party's earning 
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capacity. Moreover, to impute income where the evidence does not support such a 
conclusion does in fact constitute an abuse of discretion. See Id. citing Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In this case, the Respondent provides trial testimony indicating little more than the 
fact that Appellee works at a dental office, earns $ 15 per hour, and works nine hours per 
day Monday through Thursday (and on Fridays when needed). See Appellant's Brief at 
19, 20. Appellee is not voluntarily under-employed as were the recipient spouses in 
Thronson and Willey\ Appellee works as much as her employer allows her to subject to 
the dentists' schedules as well as the schedules of the other employees in the office. See 
Facts at 4. Appellee's dental office is not always busy enough for Appellee to work a full 
40 hour week. Id. Working more would require Appellee to leave her current employer 
- where she has worked for nearly 15 years - and seek employment elsewhere. 
Appellant fails to put forth any relevant evidence to suggest that Appellee could work in 
a similar capacity for a dental office and earn $15 an hour a full 40 hours per week. 
Given the fact that most dental offices are not open 8 hours per day 5 days per week, such 
a scenario is speculative at best. Appellant failed to meet his evidentiary burden and the 
trial court is not required to impute additional income where not supported by the record. 
In fact, to do so would constitute an abuse of discretion. 
In sum, the trial court did not err in failing to impute full-time employment to 
Appellee because the trial court is not required to impute any additional income where 
the evidence is insufficient to support such a finding. Furthermore, where imputing 
additional income absent sufficient evidentiary support constitutes an abuse of discretion, 
15 
the trial court's refusal to impute additional income to Appellee in this case does not 
amount to an abuse of discretion. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPUTING FULL-TIME 
INCOME TO JEFFREY FISH BECAUSE HE WAS DEEMED 
CAPABLE OF WORKING AND THEREFORE HAS NO NEED TO 
ESTABLISH BASIC JOB SKILLS 
Appellant argues that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(d)(iii), it was 
error for the trial court to impute an annual income of $30,000 to $40,000 to him since he 
was enrolled at the Ogden-Weber Applied Technology College ("OWATC") to be 
trained as a computer technician. See Appellant's Brief at 23. Appellant relies heavily 
on evidence that he was no longer physically able to work as an aircraft mechanic and 
that his enrollment at OWATC was necessary to establish basic job skills in a new field 
better suited to Appellant's health issues. IcL at 27. Appellant argues that the trial court's 
failure to support its decision with adequate findings of fact constitutes and abuse of 
discretion. 
Appellant's argument fails because the trial court determined that he was capable 
of working full-time, that he was under-employed at the time of trial, that he has the 
ability to earn a reasonable wage, and that given Appellant's significant work experience 
his enrollment at OWATC was unnecessary and therefore did not prevent imputation of a 
full-time wage to Appellant. See Findings of Fact at 26, 27. The trial court's findings in 
this case are "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Mancil v. 
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Smith, 2000 UT App. 378 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); citing Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 
958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The trial court acknowledged Appellant's reliance on the fact that he receives 
military disability pay, and his reliance on the testimony of Ernie Chavez, a physical 
therapist who conducted an evaluation of Appellant, to support his argument that he was 
no longer physically able to work as an aircraft mechanic. See Findings of Fact at 19, 20. 
The trial also acknowledged that Mr. Chavez's testimony was suspect "because he was a 
close friend" of the Appellant for "many years. . . ." and that Mr. Chavez himself 
acknowledged that "he should have had someone else do the evaluation . . . because of 
his friendship." Id, at 21, 22. Furthermore, the trial court acknowledged testimony by 
Jim and Mary Templeton who indicated that the Appellant engaged in a number of 
physically strenuous exercises such as "laying sod, installing a fence, lifting hay bales, 
and replacing a roof..." Id at 24. In short, the trial court was persuaded by the 
evidence presented by Appellee, that Appellant was physically able to work and that he 
was therefore underemployed. Id. at 27. 
With the ability to work, the trial court next turned its attention to Appellant's 
earning potential. The trial court heard testimony from Kristy Farnsworth, a vocational 
specialist who conducted an employment evaluation on Appellant, id. at 25. Ms. 
Farnsworth determined that Appellant was capable of earning between $24,000 and 
$57,000 per year. kL Given Appellant's employment history and the fact that he earned 
$38,000 per year when he retired; $27,000 per year from September 2000 to October 
2001; $27,000 to $46,000 from October 2001 to May 2003; and $25,382 from April 2006 
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to September 2007, the trial court deemed it appropriate to impute an annual wage of 
$30,000 to $40,000 to Appellant. Id at 13, 14, 15, 17, 26. Further, the trial court cited 
the fact that wt[t]he tax returns for 2002 through 2008 show the parties are capable of 
earning a reasonable income. . . . [t]he tax returns show that [Appellant] was either not 
working or quit working during 2004, 2005, and 2008 . . ." and "[t]he tax returns are 
relevant to establish income potential for both parties." Id. 34, 35, 36. With the ability to 
work, and based upon Appellant's historical earnings along with the expert testimony of 
Ms. Farnsworth, the trial court concluded that Appellant was capable of earning a 
reasonable income of between $30,000 and $40,000. Id 26 and 34. 
With the ability to work full-time, and with the ability to earn a reasonable income 
given his significant work experience, Appellant had no need to establish basic job skills; 
therefore, Appellant's enrollment at OWATC was unnecessary and did not prevent the 
trial court from imputing an income to him. The Utah Court of Appeals, in 
acknowledging an absence of helpful case law to define "career or occupational training 
to establish basic job skills" opined, "it seems clear that the basic job skills training 
envisioned by the statute is training which can aid a person in achieving an income 
beyond the minimum wage job which can be had with no training at all . . ." Mancil v. 
Smith, 2000 UT App. 378, 512. In Appellant's case, with upwards of twenty (20) years 
experience as an aircraft mechanic, Appellant already had the ability to earn an income 
well beyond a minimum wage job and was therefore well-beyond the basic job skills 
training envisioned by the statute. In fact, Appellant's enrollment at OWATC - to be re-
trained as a computer technician with an earning expectancy of approximately $9 per 
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hour - was actually a significant step in the wrong direction. Clearly, the trial court, 
based upon the subsidiary steps described above and which articulate its ultimate 
conclusion, was not convinced by Appellant's contemplated career change nor was it 
convinced that Appellant's enrollment at OWATC was sufficient to prevent imputation 
of full-time employment to Appellant. 
In sum, the trial court determined that Appellant was physically capable of 
working full-time, that he was under-employed at the time of trial, that he has the ability 
to earn a reasonable wage, and that given Appellant's significant work experience his 
enrollment at OWATC was unnecessary and therefore did not prevent imputation of a 
full-time wage to Appellant. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ESTABLISHING 
ALIMONY BECAUSE IT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE 
PARTIES' STANDARD OF LIVING AND ABILITY TO EARN AN 
INCOME AT THE TIME OF TRIAL 
Appellant argues that "[t]he trial court erred in awarding alimony of $800 per 
month to Diane Fish, considering the parties' standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. The trial court's award of alimony creates a serious inequity manifesting a 
clear abuse of discretion." See Appellant's Brief at 28. In support of his argument, 
Appellant revisits the parties' respective incomes between 2003 and 2009. Id. Appellant 
concludes by saying "[i]t is necessary for the trial court to analyze the parties' standard of 
living that existed during the marriage. . . ." and that, in this case, the parties' historical 
income and standard of living do not "support an award of $800 per month alimony." Id. 
at 31. 
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Appellant's argument fails because the trial court is not required to consider the 
parties' income and standard of living which existed during the marriage; it may base 
alimony on the standard of living at the time of separation or the time of trial. As 
Appellant points out, in determining an alimony award, the trial court must consider the 
factors enumerated in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a). Notably, for the purposes of this 
section, the Utah Code provides, 
As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing 
and the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordinace with 
Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard 
of living at the time of trial. 
Idat(8)(c). 
Clearly, the trial court is given broad discretion in determining an alimony award. By 
statute, the court should look to the standard of living at the time of separation, and it 
may base alimony on the standard of living at the time of trial. IdL 
In this case, the trial court looked to the expenses submitted by the parties at the 
time of trial. See Findings of Fact at 28, 32. The court determined that Appellant's 
expenses were reasonable at $2,374 per month, and that Appellee's expenses were 
reasonable at $3,000 per month. Id. Based upon the parties' reasonable monthly living 
expenses as well as the parties' respective ability to work full-time and earn a reasonable 
income, the trial court deemed alimony appropriate at $800 per month. Id at 28, 32, 34; 
and see Appellee's Section B supra. The trial court based its alimony award on the 
parties' standard of living at the time of trial which it very clearly has discretion to do. 
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In sum, the trial court did not err in establishing alimony because it properly 
considered the parties' standard of living as well as their respective abilities to earn a 
reasonable income at the time of trial. The trial court clearly acted within its discretion, 
as authorized by statute. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPUTING ADDITIONAL 
INCOME TO JEFFREY FISH BECAUSE HE WAS DEEMED 
EMPLOYABLE BY KRISTY FARNSWORTH CAPABLE OF 
EARNING A REASONABLE INCOME 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining that Jeffrey Fish was 
capable of working full-time and in imputing an income to him of $30,000 to $40,000 per 
year, because "the trial court does not indicate what job Jeffrey could have that pays him 
$30,000 to $40,000 per year." See Appellant's Brief at 32. In support of his argument, 
Appellant relies heavily on the testimony and report prepared by Ernest Chavez, a 
physical therapist at Wasatch Physical Therapy. Id. at 33. Appellant argues that he had 
always been an aircraft mechanic, but that he was physically unable to continue in that 
field according to the testimony of Mr. Chavez. WL Based upon his inability to work as 
an aircraft mechanic, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in imputing a wage of 
$30,000 to $40,000 per year him without indicating the type of employment available to 
him. 
Appellant's argument fails because Jeffrey Fish was deemed employable and 
capable of earning a reasonable income. As indicated above, the trial court 
acknowledged Appellant's reliance on the fact that he receives military disability pay, 
and his reliance on the testimony of Mr. Chavez that he was no longer physically able to 
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work as an aircraft mechanic. See Findings of Fact at 19, 20. The trial also 
acknowledged that Mr. Chavez's testimony was suspect "because he was a close friend" 
of the Appellant for "many years. . . .v and that Mr. Chavez himself acknowledged that 
"he should have had someone else do the evaluation . . . because of his friendship." IcL at 
21, 22. Furthermore, the trial court acknowledged testimony by Jim and Mary Templeton 
who indicated that the Appellant engaged in a number of physically strenuous exercises 
such as "laying sod, installing a fence, lifting hay bales, and replacing a roof. . ." Id. at 
24. In short, the trial court was persuaded by the evidence presented by Appellee, that 
Appellant was physically able to work and that he was therefore underemployed. Id. at 
27. 
With the ability to work, the trial court acknowledged the expert testimony of 
Kristy Farnsworth regarding Appellant's vocational options. Id. at 25. Ms. Farnsworth 
indicated that Appellant, considering his work history, tested interests, values and 
abilities, could work as an Aircraft Maintenance Technician, a full-time Sales 
Representative, or a full-time Logistics Specialist. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1 at pg. 1; and 
see also Trial Transcript Volume 1 at pg. 37-53. In Ms. Farnsworth's expert opinion, 
Appellant could expect to earn between $24,000 and $57,000 each year depending upon 
the vocation, h i and see Findings of Fact at 25. Based upon its conclusion that 
Appellant is capable of working full-time, and after considering the parties' past earnings 
as well as hearing expert testimony regarding Appellant's likely range of income, the trial 
court imputed an annual income of $30,000 to $40,000 to Appellant. See Findings of 
Fact at 25, 26. The trial court considered Appellant's historical earnings as evidenced by 
22 
the parties' tax returns; and, the trial court relied upon the evidence presented by Kristy 
Farnsworth that several vocational options are available to Appellant. Id. The trial court 
found Appellant to be employable and imputed an income to him within the range of 
income provided by Ms. Farnsworth. Id Ultimately, by relying upon the expert 
testimony of Ms. Farnsworth as well as the parties' historical earnings, the trial court's 
opinion is that Appellant is capable of performing one or any of the jobs listed in Ms. 
Farnsworth's report and Appellant is likely to earn the annual income imputed to him. 
In sum, the trial court did not err in imputing a full-time income to Appellant even 
though it did not specifically indicate which of the vocations provided in Kristy 
Farnsworth's report Appellant would best be suited for. The trial court clearly relied 
upon Ms. Farnsworth's expert testimony in concluding that Appellant is employable and 
that Appellant is capable of earning the income imputed to him. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's determination of alimony, and affirm the decision of the trial court in all 
other respects. 
DATED this ^ day of June, 2010. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Timothy W.\J31ackburn 
Attorney for Appellee 
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